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Article 5

Selected Evidence Problems in Illinois Will
Contests
Joachim J. Brown*
INTRODUCTION

The work of lawyers is often geared towards either creating and
preserving a factual record in anticipation of possible litigation, or
recovering and gathering relevant facts after an occurrence. These
facts can be used as evidence to reconstruct a criminal act, a contract breach, or an injury to a person or property. The evidence
removes the mystery from the occurrence and contributes to the
systematic resolution of controversy.
Estate litigation presents some unique and intriguing evidentiary
problems. Whether the litigation arises from a will contest, partition, construction, imposition of a trust, or other form of action,1
the necessary inquiry is always directed to an occurrence in which
the most important character, and potential witness, the testator,
has died. Because of his death, the best evidence to the transaction, the decedent's testimony, is never available.
The evidentiary problems encountered in the reconstruction of
the events surrounding the making of a will have prompted numerous recommendations for reform of the law of evidence in this
area. One author has suggested, only somewhat facetiously, that
attesting witnesses to a will be psychiatric experts who simultaneously certify their belief as to testamentary capacity. 2 Another
commentator has suggested that the entire execution of the will be
immortalized on videotape for possible future submission to the
trier of fact.$ Reforms have not been adopted, however, either by
* B.A. Loyola University; J.D. De Paul University, 1974; Member, Illinois Bar. The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Mary Sinclair Pearce, J.D. De Paul
University, 1979.
1.

ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDuc., CONTESTED ESTATES,
as CONTESTED ESTATES].

§ 8.15, p. 8-42 (2d ed.

1977) [hereinafter cited

2. Schuyler, Evidence of Testamentary Capacity in Illinois: A Constant Source of Controversy, 32 ILL. LAW Rav. 921, 933 n.79 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Schuyler].
3. Kahn, New Doctrine of Undue Influence, 45 ILL. BAR J. 436 (1957). See also Schuyler, supra note 2; JAMES, ILLINOIS PROBATE LAW & PRACTICE, § 92.4 (1951) [hereinafter cited
as James]. Statements made by the testator were held admissible in: Frese v. Meyer, 392 I.
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judicial construction or by statutory enactment.
This article will survey evidence problems that arise at various
stages of estate litigation in Illinois. It will focus upon evidentiary
restrictions and limitations that are likely to be encountered by the
estate advocate in the progression from the probate hearing to the
will contest. The possibility of a contract action as an alternative
to a will contest in certain situations also will be explored. Finally,
some suggestions as to evidentiary reforms will be offered.
THE DEAD MAN'S ACT

An examination of the Dead Man's Act" is imperative to under59, 63 N.E.2d 768 (1945); Mason v. Willis, 326 11. App. 481, 62 N.E.2d 135 (1945); Lich v.
Werling, 151 Ill. App. 340 (1909); Skinner v. Hemenway, 135 Ill. App. 582 (1907). In contrast, such statements were not admitted in: DeMarco v. McGill, 402 Ill. 46, 83 N.E.2d 313
(1948); Quigley v. Quigley, 370 Ill. 151, 18 N.E.2d 186 (1938); Anderson v. Anderson, 191 IMI.
100, 60 N.E. 810 (1901); Richards v. Miller, 62 Ill. 417 (1872).
Suggestions for reform have been varied. Over forty years ago, Schuyler, supra note 2,
urged the application of a discretionary rule in determining admissibility of lay opinion.
Such a rule would permit the abolition of distinctions between facts and conclusions as to
the testator's capacity.
A more detailed suggestion for reform was advocated by James. He suggested eight distinct rules for governing the admissibility of lay opinion. JAMES, supra, at § 92.4 (1).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, 2 (1979). The statute provides:
In the trial of any civil action in which any party sues or defends as the representative of a deceased or incompetent person, no adverse party or person directly
interested in the action shall be allowed to testify on his own behalf to any conversation with the deceased or incompetent person, except in the following instances:
(1) If any person testifies on behalf of the representative to any conversation with
the deceased or incompetent person or to any event which took place in the presence of the deceased or incompetent person, any adverse party or interested person if otherwise competent, may testify concerning the same conversation or
event.
(2) If the deposition of the deceased or incompetent person is admitted in evidence on behalf of the representative, any adverse party or interested person, if
otherwise competent, may testify concerning the same matters admitted in
evidence.
(3) Any testimony competent under Section 3 of this Act, is not barred by this
Section.
(4) No person shall be barred from testifying as to any fact relating to the heirship
of a decedent.
As used in this section:
(a)"Incompetent person" means any person who is adjudged by the court in the
pending civil action to be unable to testify by reason of mental illness, mental
retardation or deterioration of mentality.
(b) "Representative" means an executor, administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of
a deceased person and any guardian, or trustee of any such heir, legatee or devisee
or a guardian or conservator of, or guardian ad litem for, an incompetent person.
(c) "Person directly interested in the action" or "interested person" does not include a person who is interested solely as executor, trustee or any other fiduciary
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standing evidentiary problems in estate litigation, since the Act
pervades every stage of the litigation. Despite constitutional challenge 5 and attempts at repeal, 6 the Dead Man's Act remains a significant obstacle in re-establishing the circumstances at issue in estate litigation. The statute precludes any person directly
"interested '7 in the outcome of the litigation from testifying as to
any transaction involving the decedent.' This ban applies even to
the parties to the litigation. 9
As applied in will contests, the heirs at law and the beneficiaries
capacity, whether or not he receives or expects to receive compensation for acting
in that capacity.
(d) This amendatory Act of 1973 applies to proceedings filed on or after its effective date.
Another statute concerning the admission of evidence is the Proof of Handwriting Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 51,
50 et seq (1979).
5. The constitutionality of the act was upheld in the face of an equal protection challenge arguing that only the adverse party was precluded from testifying, and that this preclusion denied that party equal access to justice and denied due process by excluding this
testimony. Murphy v. Hook, 21 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 316 N.E.2d 146 (1974). See also Lueth v.
GoodKnecht, 345 111.197, 177 N.E. 690 (1931); Segur's Estate v. Jacoby, 5 Ill. App. 3d 459,
283 N.E.2d 76 (1972). This holding is compatible with the reasoning that the purpose of the
statute is to put the parties on an equal footing. Since the decedent is not able to testify,
neither should the adversary of his estate. Morse v. Hardinger, 34 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 341
N.E.2d 172 (1976); Schuppenhauer v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 30 II. App. 3d 607, 332
N.E.2d 583, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1975); In re Estate of Colewell, 9 Ill.
App. 3d 247,
292 N.E.2d 96 (1972); 37 ILL. LAW & PRACTICE, WITNESSES § 42 (1958). This stated justification is less prominent than the fraud-preventative theory. See note 8 infra.
6. A repealer bill was defeated in the 1977 session of the Illinois legislature. CONTESTED
ESTATES, supra note 1, at § 6.16.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, 52(4)(c) (1979). See note 4 supra.
8. The rule evolved from the common law exclusion of the testimony, whether voluntary
or by admission, of all persons with a proprietary or pecuniary interest in the outcome of
the contest. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 65, at 142 (2d Ed. 1972).
The harshness of this rule gave way to reform in England, but the modern Dead Man's
Statutes emerged as an exception in the United States.
In this country, however, a compromise was forced upon the reformers. The objection was raised that in controversies over contracts or other transactions where
one party to the transaction had died and the other survived, hardship and fraud
would result if the surviving parties or interested persons were permitted to testify to the transactions. The survivor could testify though the adverse party's lips
would be sealed in death. This is a seductive argument. It was accepted in nearly
all the early statutes, at a time when the real dispute was whether the general
disqualification should be abolished or retained, and the concession for survivors'
cases undoubtedly seemed a minor one. But the concession has now become so
ingrained a part of judicial and professional habits of thinking that it is hard to
dislodge by argument.
Id.
9. For detailed analyses of the Illinois Dead Man's Act, as amended in 1973, see Comment, New Life to the Dead Man's Act in Illinois, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 428 (1974); Comment,
Illinois' Amended Dead Man's Act: A PartialReform, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 700.
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under the will are all precluded by the Act from testifying because
of their "interest" in the controversy."0 The only way the statute
permits such persons to testify is if the adversary first "opens the
door" by presenting the deposition of the decedent, or if the representative of the estate presents testimony by disinterested witnesses."1 Even then interested persons can testify on rebuttal only
as to the limited question of the specific occurrence or transaction
12
which has been "opened" in the case in chief.
The prevailing modern justification for the Dead Man's Act is to
prevent fabrication of self-serving and fraudulent evidence."3 The
dubious value of such a rationale for depriving interested parties to
the litigation of the opportunity to testify on their own behalf is
apparent." Nonetheless, the Act retains vitality in Illinois and
serves as a serious limitation in all stages of estate litigation.
THE HEARING TO ADMIT THE WILL TO PROBATE

Will contests generally proceed in two stages: (1) the hearing to

admit the will to probate and (2) the will contest proper." At the
10. Kahn, The Dead Man's Act is Alive and Well, 63 ILL. BAR. J. 332, 332 (1975) citing
Taylor v. Pegram, 151 Ill. 106, 37 N.E. 837 (1894).
11. Note that waiver of the incompetency provisions of the statute can only be made by
an adversary, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51,
2(1) (1979), and that co-parties may not call one
another to testify in each other's behalf, as this would defeat the purpose of the rule. Mitchell v. Van Scoyk, 1 111. 2d 160, 115 N.E.2d 226 (1953); Linn v. Linn, 221 Ill. 606 (1914).
12. See note 4 supra.
13. Green v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Simon v. Plotkin, 50 Il1.
App. 3d 603, 365 N.E.2d 1022 (1977); Mortimer v. Mortimer, 6 Ill. App. 3d 217, 285 N.E.2d
542 (1972).
14. One author has observed:
Most commentators agree that the expedient of refusing to listen to the survivor
is, in the words of Bentham, a "blind and brainless" technique. In seeking to avoid
injustice to one side, the statute-makers have ignored the equal possibility of creating injustice to the other. The temptation to the survivo to fabricate a claim or
defense is obvious enough, so obvious indeed that any jury will realize that his
story must be cautiously heard. A searching cross-examination will usually, in case
of fraud, reveal discrepancies inherent in the "tangled web" of deception. In any
event, the survivor's disqualification is more likely to balk the honest than the
dishonest survivor. One who would not balk at perjury will hardly hesitate at suborning a third person, who would not be disqualified, to swear to the false story.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE

§ 65 (2d ed. 1972). Among the numerous

articles on the subject, compare Kahn, Let's Give the Dead Man's Statute a Decent Burial,
55 ILL. BAR J. 430 (1967), with Hunter, The Dead Man's Act Must Be Retained, 55 ILL. BAR
J. 512 (1967). See also Comment, A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence and
Illinois Law, 49 Nw. U. L. REV. 481, 504-15 (1954).
15. A contestant is entitled to a bench trial at the hearing, In re Estate of Haines, 51 Ill.
App. 3d 163, 366 N.E.2d 548 (1977), and a jury trial at the will contest. There is no res
judicata effect to the first trial.
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hearing to admit the will to probate, the sole question presented is
whether the will submitted to probate conforms to the statutory
requirements.1 6 The burden of establishing the statutory prerequisites is on the proponent of the will. 17 Once that burden is satisfied, the document will be admitted to probate regardless of the
lack of dispositive provisions or other deficiencies of the document
itself.1 8 Essentially, the proponent of the will must provide two
witnesses"9 who will testify that they (1) saw the decedent sign or
acknowledge the will in their presence; (2) witnessed the document
in the presence of the testator; and (3) believed the testator to be
of sound mind and memory. 0 An attestation clause2 reciting com-

16.

The formal statutory requirements for the admission of a will are met:
(a) When each of 2 attesting witnesses to a will states that (1) he was present and
saw the testator or some person in his presence and by his direction sign the will
in the presence of the witness or the testator acknowledged it to the witness as his
act, (2) the will was attested by the witness in the presence of the testator and, (3)
he believed the testator to be of sound mind and memory at the time of signing or
acknowledging the will, the execution of the will is sufficiently proved to admit it
to probate, .
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1101/2, $ 6-4 (1979). The predecessor statute ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2
6-7 (1976) required that the witnesses "testify" to rather than "state" the facts. Evidence
not relevant to the actual execution of the document in question will be excluded.
It has long been recognized that the proof necessary to entitle a will to probate is
confined to the essential elements fixed by the statute. . . and is for the purpose
of establishing whether a prima facie case of validity has been made. . . . The
hearing is to determine whether the will has been executed with the formalities
required by statute . . . no other evidence is required and no contradictory evidence is admissible...
Ruffing v. Glissendorf, 41 Ill. 2d 412, 420, 243 N.E.2d 236, 240 (1968). See also In re Estate
of Ketter, 63 Ill. App. 3d 796, 380 N.E.2d 385 (1978).
17. In re Estate of Zingraf, 51 Ill. App. 3d 145, 366 N.E.2d 464 (1977). If the will is
executed in due form, then the proponent is aided by a presumption of validity. In re Estate
of Willavize, 21 111. 2d 40, 171 N.E.2d 21 (1960); In re Estate of Thomas, 6 I1. App. 3d 70,
284 N.E.2d 513 (1972).
18. In re Estate of Weaver, 50 Ill. App. 3d 223, 365 N.E.2d 1038 (1977); In re Estate of
Parker, 42 Ill. App. 3d 860, 356 N.E.2d 967 (1977).
19. The statute requires the testimony of a minimum of two attesting witnesses. One
witness is not sufficient to sustain the burden of proof. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1101/2 6-4 (1979);
Hill v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 Ill. 42, 152 N.E. 545 (1926). See also In re Estate of
Randall, 82 Ill. App. 3d 593, 403 N.E.2d 48 (1980).
20. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 1101/2 $ 6-4 (1979); In re Estate of Parker, 42 Ill. App. 3d 860, 356
N.E.2d 967 (1976).
21. The attestation clause is the language prefacing the witnesses' act of attesting to the
signature of the testator. It usually includes language reciting that the witnesses signed the
will in the presence of and at the direction of the testator, and that they believed the testator to be of sound mind and memory. Its use, although historically prevalent, was not independently sanctioned by statute until 1979, when the Probate Act was amended to include
attestation as a means to admitting the will to probate. The statute provides in part:
(b) The statements of a witness to prove the will under subsection 6-4(a) may be
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pliance with the statute can be used if the attesting witnesses are
forgetful2 2 or if either of them repudiates his or her statements, 3

but it cannot be used as a substitute for the testimony of both
attesting witnesses.2 4
In addition to the statutory prerequisites, the proponent of the
will is permitted to introduce any "other evidence competent to
establish a will."' 28 This may include all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the document, as encompassing the res gestae.2 6 Testimony from the draftsman, nonattesting
occurrence witnesses, and, where forgery is in issue, acknowledgements by the testator2 7 would all be admissible on the behalf of the
proponent.
One of the most perplexing evidentiary problems for the contestant is the limited inquiry into testamentary capacity at the hearing
stage. The root of this problem is that the statute only requires
that the attesting witnesses have the "belief" that the testator was
of sound mind and memory. No foundation need be laid for such
testimony 2s and the refusal to permit a witness' testimony without

made by (1) testimony before the court, (2) an attestation clause signed by the
witness and forming a part of or attached to the will or, (3) an affidavit which is
signed by the witness at or after the time of attestation and which forms part of
the will or is attached to the will or to an accurate facsimile of the will.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 6-4(b) (1979).
22. Knaphurst v. Lindauer, 61 Ill. App. 2d 269, 210 N.E.2d 23 (1965); In re Estate of
Salzman, 17 Ill. App. 3d 304, 308 N.E.2d 83 (1974).
23. In re Estate of Krausman, 131 Ill. App. 2d 514, 268 N.E.2d 505 (1971); CoNTESTED
ESTATES, supra note 1, at § 2.6.
24. In re Estate of Balicki, 408 Ill. 84, 96 N.E. 2d 516 (1951); In re Estate of Jacobson,
75 Ill. App. 3d 102, 393 N.E.2d 1069 (1979); In re Estate of Zingraf, 51 I1. App. 3d 145, 366
N.E.2d 464 (1977).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2,
6-4, 8-2(c) (1979).
26. Res gestae statements or declarations are those which are made spontaneously or
contemporaneously with and as a part of the transaction,event or condition to which they
relate. GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL 191 (1963). The imperative in this rule is that the
statement or act submitted as part of the "res gestae" must truly be a part of the conditions
or circumstances under which the will came into existence. Therefore the physical and verbal condition of the testator, the identity of those persons assisting in the preparation and
execution of the will, the statements of the testator and witnesses at the time of execution,
etc. are all examples of the res gestae.
See 1.James, supra note 3, at § 43.52(m)(12), n.75. Caveat: excessive use of the res gestae
exception to the hearsay rule can be hazardous to one's credibility. See, e.g., Res Gestae, or
Why is That Event Speaking and What is it Doing in This Courtroom?, 63 A.B.A.J. 968
(1977). See also In re Will of Rutledge, 5 Ill. App. 2d 355, 125 N.E.2d 683 (1955).
27. Harp v. Parr, 168 Ill. 459, 48 N.E. 113 (1897).
28. Brownlie v. Brownlie, 357 II. 117, 191 N.E. 268 (1934); In re Estate of Haines, 51111.
App. 3d 163, 366 N.E.2d 548 (1977).
In Haines, the decedent's will was witnessed by the employees of a bank trust depart-
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foundation is reversible error.5 9 The contestant cannot introduce
any evidence as to testamentary capacity. He or she may only
cross-examine the attesting witnesses as to their belief.30 Impeachment of the attesting witnesses may include unfamiliarity with the
testator as well as prior inconsistent statements as to their belief.3 '
There also may be impeachment by inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the document itself, not only by
cross-examination but also by the testimony of other witnesses."'
Further evidence of testamentary capacity or undue influence s beyond the scope of the attesting witness' belief, however, can be
presented only in a statutory will contest.
In addition to restrictions on cross examination of the attesting
witnesses, the contestant is severely limited by statute as to the
issues that can be presented to the court to oppose admission of
the purported will to probate. The contestant may only introduce
evidence on the issues of fraud, forgery, compulsion or "other improper conduct."3 4 In order to establish fraud, there must be:
ment, who were allowed to testify as to their belief that the testator was of sound mind and
memory, over the objection of the contestant that no foundation was laid for that testimony.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Brownhie stated:
The attesting witnesses are witnesses that the statute requires. They are in a sense
placed there by the statute for the purpose of observing the method of the execution of the will and of determining whether the testator at the time is possessed of
testamentary capacity. An attesting witness may form a belief or opinion of the
testator's mental capacity from his appearance at the time he executed the instrument in controversy.
357 Ill. at 122-23, 191 N.E. at 271.
29. Both v. Nelson, 31 In. 2d 511, 202 N.E.2d 494 (1964).
The adherence to the statutory language of the attesting witness' 'belief' is long standing,
and specific knowledge of the testator by the attesting witness is not required. Hill v. Kehr,
228 Ill. 204, 81 N.E. 848 (1907).
30. Bley v. Luebeck, 377 Ill.
50, 35 N.E.2d 334 (1941); In re Estate of Davison, 119 I11.
App. 2d 477, 256 N.E.2d 16 (1970).
31. Craig v. Trotter, 252 Ill. 228, 96 N.E. 1003 (1911). Courts look with suspicion to such
contradictory statements of attesting witnesses and hold the statements and the witnesses
in disrepute. In re Estate of Willavize, 21 111. 2d 40, 45, 171 N.E.2d 21 (1960); Szarat v.
Schuevr, 365 Ill.
323, 6 N.E.2d 625 (1937); CONTESTED ESTATES, supra note 1, at § 2.6. Illinois takes the minority view that an unavailable attesting witness cannot be impeached by
inconsistent statements in contravention of the terms of the will and the Probate Act. Craig

v. Wismar, 310 III. 262, 141 N.E. 766 (1923). See also ILLINOIS
LEGAL EDUCATION FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 641 (1975).

INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING

32. Such witnesses would be those people who attended the execution of the will but did
not attest to the will.
33. As to testamentary capacity, see Stuke v. Glaser, 223 Ill. 316, 79 N.E. 105 (1906) and
cases at note 35 infra. As to undue influence, see Sheperd v. Yocum, 323 11. 328, 154 N.E.
156 (1926); In re Estate of Jackson, 56 Ill. App. 3d 915, 372 N.E.2d 711 (1978).
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 6-4 (1979).
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such conduct as a trick or device by which a person may be induced to sign the paper under the impression it is something else,
or to the alteration of the will after it is signed, or the substitution of another paper for part of the will after it has been signed,
5
and matters of like character.

The standard is similar to the distinction between fraud as a real
defense as opposed to a personal defense in the enforcement of negotiable instruments."' It has also been characterized as fraud in
the execution"7 as distinguished from fraud in the inducement.
Proof of forgery in will contests is not unlike the proof required
in other civil cases. In will contests, however, the testator is unable
to verify his signature. Because of this unique situation, it is the
attesting witnesses who are best suited to authenticate the testator's signature. Although lay and expert opinion evidence as to the
signature of the testator is admissible," care should be taken by all
35. Given the often-stated policy of the courts to provide for swift appointment of an
estate representative to marshall the assets, In re Estate of Marcucci, 54 Ill. 2d 266, 296
N.E.2d 849 (1973); Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 394 Ill. 452, 68 N.E.2d 892
(1946); In re Estate of Carr, 126 Ill. App. 2d 461, 262 N.E.2d 54 (1970), the judicial interpretation of the triable issues is quite narrow. For example, although undue influence has been
deemed a "specie of fraud," Flanigon v. Smith, 337 Ill. 572, 169 N.E. 767 (1930); see also
Smith v. Henline, 174 Ill. 184, 51 N.E.2d 227 (1898); Sterling v. Kramer, 15 Ill. App. 2d 230,
145 N.E.2d 757 (1957), evidence of undue influence has been held to be clearly inadmissible
in the hearing to admit the will to probate. Ruffing v. Glissendorf, 41 Ill. 2d 412, 243 N.E.2d
236 (1968); Sheperd v. Yocum, 323 Ill. 328, 154 N.E. 156 (1926); Stuke v. Glaser, 223 Ill. 316,
320, 79 N.E. 105, 107 (1906); In re Estate of Jackson, 56 Ill. App. 3d 915, 372 N.E.2d 711
(1978); In re Estate of Davison, 119 Ill. App. 2d 477, 256 N.E.2d 16 (1970); In re Estate of
Guinane, 65 Ill. App. 2d 193, 213 N.E. 2d 30 (1965). These cases hold that, although in
certain circumstances wills procurred through a breach of fiduciary duty will be presumed to
be fraudulent, or that a constructive fraud will be found in the event that the will is executed in breach of a contract to devise, the hearing on proof of will is limited to the issues of
due execution and competency of the testator.
36. Compare ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 26, 1 3-305(2)(c) (1979) with ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, 1 3306(B) (1979) and comments thereto. The "real" type of fraud designated in the Uniform
Commercial Code is identified as "such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign
the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of
its character or essential terms" ILL REv. STAT. ch. 26, 3-305(2)(c) (1979). The official
comment to the UCC describes the "common illustration" of a maker tricked into signing a
note on the belief that it is merely a receipt. This concept is easily transferred to the execution of a will, if the testator has no reason or opportunity to know the character of the
document which he is signing. The "personal" defense of fraud, however (analogous to the
types of fraud which are outside the scope of the proof-of-will hearing but within the ambit
of the will contest) is not separately defined in the UCC other than by its absence from the
definition in V 3-305(2)(c). It would include false representations, Drumm Constr. Co. v.
Forbes, 305 Ill. 303, 137 N.E. 225 (1922) and breach of fiduciary duty, Perry v. Engel, 296
Ill. 549, 130 N.E. 340 (1921).

37.

CONTESTED ESTATES,

supra note 1, at § 2.7.

38.

CONTESTED

supra note 1, at § 2.7(4). The expert opinion is entitled to little

ESTATES,
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parties to comply with the Proof of Handwriting Act,s 9 which requires notice to adversaries and a "reasonable opportunity" to examine the comparative examplars of handwriting by the
adversary.40
While there are no reported Illinois decisions involving "compulsion or other improper conduct" in will contests, the standard of
evidence in such cases would appear to parallel that required to
establish the type of duress which under the Uniform Commercial2
Code (UCC) 4 1 "will render the obligation of the party a nullity.'4
The official comment to the UCC contemplates a "gun-to-thehead" type of duress, although even threats of immediate bodily
harm and imminent death may not always be sufficient to establish
duress.' 3 The official comment also recognizes that duress is a matter of degree, and that the conduct must be so harsh as to nullify a
contractual obligation." There is a paucity of cases construing
what constitutes duress, so that even in the commercial context
there are no firm guidelines. For purposes of a probate hearing,
duress would have to be shown by very clear and highly persuasive
facts.' 5 More subtle types of duress are susceptible of proof in the
46
will context.
In addition to these statutory grounds which the contestant can
raise in the probate hearing, Illinois courts permit the issue of revocation of the proferred will to be litigated at the hearing. 47 This is

weight, especially in light of the testimony of the attesting witness. Moreover, the expert
will not be allowed to conclude any facts as to time, place, or mental condition of the testator from his signature. Heideman v. Kelsey, 19 Il. 2d 258, 166 N.E.2d 596 (1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 869 (1960).
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, 1 50 et seq. (1979).
40. Id. This precondition is required whether or not the adversary formally requests it in
discovery.
41. CONTESTED ESTATES, supra note 1 at1} 2-7(5) citing 2 JAMES, supra note 3, at § 69.12.
Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, T 3-305(2)(b) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, 3-305(b) (1979).
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, i 3-305(b) (1979).
43. State v. Wegener, 180 Iowa 102, 118-123, 166 N.W. 1040, 1045-1047 (1917).
44. Unenforced threats are insufficient. Porter v. First Nat'l Bank, 212 11. App. 250
(1918).
45. It is submitted that the forcing of the decedent to sign the document while his hand
is being physically guided by the malefactor would constitute sufficient duress, especially if
accompanied by a "gun at the head" or threats of imminent bodily hearm. If the threats are
implemented, the testator would arguably be incapable of revoking the will. Conversely, the
testator may be found to have ratified the will if he takes no action after the duress is
removed.
46. These would include threats or misrepresentations or withholding of essential goods
or services by one in a position to do so.
47. In re Estate of Millsap, 75 Ill. 2d 247, 388 N.E.2d 374 (1979); In re Estate of Holm-
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limited to whether the statutory requirements of revocation have
occurred, and does not include consideration of whether the subject will revokes a prior joint and mutual will. 4 '
Finally, one overriding problem in presenting evidence on the is-

sues which can be raised at the hearing to admit the will to probate is the difficulty in gathering relevant evidence because of the
lack of discovery at this stage.' 0 Notwithstanding the provisions of
the Probate Act"l or the urgings of scholars, 5 recent appellate

berg, 400 Ill. 366, 81 N.E.2d 188 (1948); Research Hosp. v. Continental Illinois Bank &
Trust Co., 352 Ill. 510, 186 N.E. 170 (1933).
48. The statutory standard for a valid revocation is set forth as follows:
(a) A will may be revoked only (1) by burning, cancelling, tearing or obliterating it
by the testator himself or by some person in his presence and by his direction and
consent, (2) by the execution of a later will declaring the revocation, (3) by a later
will to the extent that it is inconsistent with the prior will, or, (4) by the execution
of an instrument declaring the revocation and signed and attested in the manner
prescribed by this Article for the signing and attestation of a will.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2,
4-7 (1979).
In the event that a revocation of the will offered for probate can be shown, in the manner
described in the statute, it is within the scope of the hearing on the admission of the will to
probate.
49. In re Estate of Marcucci, 54 Ill. 2d 266, 296 N.E.2d 849 (1973); In re Estate of Lockwood, 124 Ill. App. 2d 439, 260 N.E.2d 344 (1970). Family settlement agreements to avoid
probate are outside the scope of the hearing. Robertson v. Yager, 327 II. 346, 158 N.E. 709
(1927).
Arguably, the prior joint and mutual will, if offered for probate first, could be admitted.
Then, the attempted revocation by the later will, in breach of an express or implied agreement not to revoke, could be tried in the hearing to admit the joint and mutual will. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has expressly declared that evidence of the prior will or its attempted revocation is not admissible at the probate hearing. Such evidence can only be
presented in a will contest after the most recent will is admitted to probate. See, e.g., In re
Estate of Marcucci, 54 Ill. 2d 266, 296 N.E.2d 849 (1973).
50. Evidence of undue influence and breach of contract to make a will are properly
raised only in the statutory will contest.
51. The Probate Act incorporates the Civil Practice Act as applicable to all proceedings.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 1 1-6 (1979). The Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 1
(1979), does not exclude probate proceedings, nor does Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules,
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110A,
1 (1979).
52. In response to In re Estate of Kvasauskas, 5 Ill. App. 3d 202, 282 N.E.2d 465 (1972)
and In re Estate of Haines, 51 Ill. App. 3d 163, 366 N.E.2d 548 (1977), one commentator
asserted:
In the few instances where there is a contest on a petition to admit a will to probate, the litigants should have their statutory right to invoke all discovery procedures. The administration of the decedent's estate will not be delayed. During the
litigation, the court may appoint an administrator to collect who can be empowered by the court order from time to time with all of the powers of a duly appointed administrator. §§ 10-1-10-5
The rulings and reasons in Kvasauskas and Haines opinions should not be invoked against a proponent or contestant and bar them from their absolute statu-
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court decisions hold that no discovery can be taken prior to the
probate hearing. Additonally, refusal of discovery requests is not
an abuse of judicial discretion."3 These decisions emphasize the nature of the probate hearing as a proceeding to determine a preliminary issue. 5 " The result, nevertheless, is to hamper and limit the
evidence presented at the hearing.

tory right to utilize all discovery remedies in a proceeding to admit a will to
probate.
CONTESTED ESTATES,

supra note 1, at § 2.18.

53. In re Estate of Haines, 51 111. App. 3d 163, 366 N.E.2d 548 (1977); In re Estate of
Kvasauskas, 5 Ill. App. 3d 202, 282 N.E.2d 465 (1972). Such holdings are a logical extension
of the policy of the expeditious administration of a decedent's estate while preserving the
right to contest the will in a separate proceeding. Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
394 Ill. 452, 68 N.E.2d 892 (1946); In re Estate of Ketter, 63 Ill. App. 3d 796, 380 N.E.2d 385
(1978); In re Estate of Carr, 126 Ill. App. 2d 461, 262 N.E.2d 54 (1970). It is unknown
whether the current posture of speeding along the probate hearing will continue with the
new procedure contemplated by § 6-4 et. seq. of the Probate Act, wherein the will is first
admitted without notice and Letters issued, with the right of beneficiaries to demand formal
proof. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 1 6-4, 6-10, 6-21 (1979).
54. The First Appellate District has taken this one step further by ruling that an order
admitting a will to probate is not a final and appealable order. In re Estate of Martino, 72
Ill. App. 3d 867, 391 N.E.2d 412 (1979). The 1979 Amendments to the Probate Act, for the
first time, permit the proponent of the will to contest its denial of admission to probate. ILL.
8-2 (1979). Prior to the 1979 Amendment, orders denying admission
REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2,
were clearly appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(b). In re Estate of Millsap, 75 Ill. 2d
247, 388 N.E.2d 374 (1979); Heuberger v. Schwartz, 41 11. App. 2d 28, 190 N.E.2d 163
(1963). The dissent in Millsap points out the inequities of the prior rules to the proponent,
who had only one opportunity to secure the admission of the will. Although the prior law
granting two trials to the contestant and one to the proponent had withstood constitutional
challenge, O'Brien v. Bonfield, 213 Ill. 428, 72 N.E. 1090 (1904); In re Estate of Haines, 51
Ill. App. 3d 163, 366 N.E.d 548 (1977); Kahn, Double Trials in Will Contests, 60 ILL. BAR
J. 309 (1971), the statutory modification should alleviate the possibility of a proponent being unfairly surprised and prejudiced by the abbreviated proceeding.
The amendment may indicate that the proponent will have to institute a will contest if he
wants to seek review of an order denying admission, despite the statutory provision exculpating the proponent from any duty to do so. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 1 8-2(f) (1979).
Arguably, ar order denying admission of the will to probate (or revoking the letters of administration and vacating the order admitting the will under the new procedure provided at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, T 6-21 (1979)) remains final and appealable, since it meets the
requirements of Rule 304(b) and since the contest of the denial of admission is optional.
Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1) provides:
(b) Judgments and Orders Appealable Without Special Finding. The following
judgments and orders are appealable without the finding required for appeals
under paragraphs (a) of this rule: (1) A judgment or order entered in the administration of an estate, guardianship, conservatorship, or similar proceeding which
finally determines a right or status of a party.
ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 110A,

304(b)(1) (1979).
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THE WILL CONTEST

(A)

Submission of the Probate Hearing Transcript to the Jury
in the Will Contest

One of the evidentiary problems encountered in the will contest
is created at the hearing to admit the will to probate. The entire
transcript of the testimony of witnesses at the hearing is admissible as substantive evidence at the will contest.55 Historically, only
the oath and certificate of an attesting witness were admissible in
the will contest, and errors committed at the probate hearing were
excluded from the transcript offered at the will contest. In the
landmark case of Belfield v. Coop,' 7 however, the Illinois Supreme

Court held that the entire transcript was admissible regardless of
the otherwise incompetent testimony of a party who was called by
an adversary to testify as to allegations of fraud.58 The Belfield
court did not address the issue of erroneous examination or erroneous evidentiary rulings other than the waiver of the incompetency
standard of the Dead Man's Act. 9 It would, however, appear from
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 11 8-1(c), 8-2(c) (1979). The transcript is admitted even
though none of the issues raised and determined therein are res judicata as to the second
trial. Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 394 Ill. 452, 68 N.E.2d 892 (1946); In re Estate
of Carr, 126 Il. App. 2d 461, 262 N.E.2d 54 (1970).
56. For example, the question, "Was there any fraud, duress or undue influence used to
get her to sign the instrument?" was submitted to each attesting witness at the hearing to
admit the will to probate in Buerger v. Buerger, 317 Ill. 401, 148 N.E. 274 (1925) and Adams
v. First M.E. Church, 251 II. 268, 96 N.E. 253 (1911). The court in both cases held that the
question should have been excluded from the reading of the transcript of the hearing to the
jury in the will contest.
57. 8 Ill. 2d 293, 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956). In Belfield, an "interested" person, Sara Grate,
made a recording, on a wire recording device, of the conversations of the decedent immediately prior to the execution of the will. The court held that the recording should have been
admitted by the trial court. The basis for the holding was that since the recording was a
"mechanical witness," the evidence was coming from the recording rather than from the
incompetent witness.
Sare Grate was then called by the contestant to testify as an adverse witness at the hearing. When the proponent sought to admit the transcript of the probate hearing to the jury
in the will contest, the court held that contestant had waived her incompetency under the
Dead Man's Act. 8 IM. 2d at 307-08, 134 N.E.2d at 257. Thus, the entire transcript was
admitted into evidence. 8 II. 2d at 306, 134 N.E.2d at 256.
Although the court relied on the predecessor statute to § 8-1(c) of the Probate Act, ILL.
8-1(c) (1975), the new § 8-2(c) is identical in that they both provide
REv. STAT. ch. 1101/2,
for the trial of a will contest by a contestant. The 1979 Amendments, however, introduced a
"reverse will contest" where the proponent is permitted to file an action as well as a jury
demand to vacate an order denying the proferred will to probate. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2,
8-2(c) (1979).
58. 8 Ill. 2d at 306-08, 134 N.E.2d at 256-57.
59. Id.
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a reading of that case and the plain language of the statute that
the entire transcript of the evidence presented at the hearing on
the petition to admit the will to probate is admissible in the will
contest, errors and all. 60
One example of the problems which complete admission raises is
that it appears
that an "interested" attesting witness, even if
"purged"6 1 of his or her benefit, could nonetheless still be an "interested" party for purposes of the Dead Man's Act.6 2 Even though

60. Imagine a scenario wherein the proponent's counsel asks the attesting witnesses conclusionary questions such as: "Was the testator incompetent? Was there any undue influence? Did he see you sign as a witness? Was he of sound mind?" The trial judge, sitting
without a jury, could very well overrule objections to these improper questions based on the
harmless error rule or on the presumption that a judge only considers relevant evidence.
At the will contest, under Belfield, the entire colloquy would be admitted as part of the
transcript. Thus, the improper testimony becomes substantive evidence. Although no such
case as the illustration has yet arisen, the extreme prejudicial potential of such an occurence
is apparent. The attorney must, therefore, exercise extreme caution at the non-jury hearing,
and it is suggested that the transcript be certified on motion only to include admissible
matters.
61. A necessary witness to a will or codicil is limited to the benefit he would have received if the document he has witnessed were not admitted. This common-law rule of incompetency has been codified into the "purging statute." At common law, the self-interest
of the witness would have rendered him incompetent to testify thereby defeating admission
of the will to probate. The current statute, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 1 4-6(a) (1979)
provides:
Beneficiary or creditor as witness. (a) If any beneficial legacy or interest is given in
a will to a person attesting its execution or to his spouse, the legacy or interest is
void as to that beneficiary and all persons claiming under him, unless the will is
otherwise duly attested by a sufficient number of witnesses as provided by this
Article exclusive of that person and he may be compelled to testify as if the legacy
or interest had not been given, but the beneficiary is entitled to receive so much of
the legacy or interest given to him by the will as does not exceed the value of the
share of the testator's estate to which he would be entitled were the will not
established.
Note that the benefit received by a witness is "purged" or disallowed only if his testimony
thereto is necessary to the establishment of the will. Thus, as long as two other witnesses are
available to testify, the otherwise purged beneficiary's share is saved.
Similarly, execution of a codicil will secure the legacy, under the will, to the interested
party. Since the witness to the codicil provides the necessary testimony, the witness will
take only that which he would have received under the will if the codicil were not established. Thus, by application of the statute, an heir who is a necessary witness is limited to
his intestate share while a non-relative necessary witness is denied his bequest entirely. A
witness to a codicil would be limited to the bequest- in the will which the codicil amends.
62. E.g., the attesting witness to a codicil is limited to the bequest in the will itself as
republished in the codicil. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 4-6 (1979). He is therefore still an
"interested" person for purposes of the Dead Man's Act. The purging effect of T 4-6 is applicable also to spouses of beneficiaries who are attesting witnesses, and such spouses are "interested" persons to render them incompetent under the Dead Man's Act. Britt v. Darnell,
315 Ill. 385, 146 N.E. 510 (1925); Treleaven v. Dixon, 119 Ill. 548, 9 N.E. 189 (1886).
Note that spouses may also be incompetent to testify for each other under § 5 of the
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this issue has not arisen in any reported Illinois decision, the perplexing situation presented by a necessary witness rendered
"doubly incompetent" ' could present an intriguing problem. The
necessity of the testimony of the attesting witness, required by
statute, mandates that such testimony be admitted, both at the
probate hearing and by submission of the transcript at the will
contest. The testimony should be limited, however, to the circumstances surrounding the execution. Additionally, such testimony
should be subject to proper impeachment for self-interest.
(B)

Testamentary Capacity

1. Attesting Witnesses
The testimony of the attesting witnesses at the probate hearing
on the testator's competency lays the groundwork for further opinion testimony from witnesses for both sides to the will contest. It is
both obvious and unavoidable that the hearing evidence thus embraces not only the witness' opinion, but also represents the conclusion of the witness on the ultimate issue of competency. There
is considerable confusion among the cases regarding conclusions
and opinion and little clarification has emerged." For example, it
has been held error to permit an attesting witness to conclude
whether any fraud, undue influence or duress was used to induce
the testator to execute a wil,65 but not error to permit the attesting witness to testify as to whether, as far as he could discern, the
testator was subject to undue influence. 6" Furthermore, the seemingly innocuous and routine question to an attesting witness of
whether the witness signed the will in the presence of the testator
has been held to constitute reversible error as representing the
conclusion of the witness.6 Considering that no foundation need
5 (1979). See also 3 JAMES, supra note 3, at §
Evidence Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51
92.5(g)(10). Note, also that several interested attesting witnesses may not "bootstrap" one
another into a benefit under the will, but that their testimony will be allowed on the issue of
App. 3d 463, 384 N.E.2d 589 (1979).
due execution. In re Estate of Watts, 67 Ill.
63. The witness would be incompetent once by virtue of the Dead Man's Act and once
under the purging statute.
64. See James, supra note 3, at § 92.4(1), wherein the author suggests several rules for
opinion testimony on capacity. See also Schuyler, supra note 2, at 932.
401, 148 N.E. 274 (1925); Adams v. First M.E. Church,
65. Buerger v. Buerger, 317 Ill.
251 Ill. 268, 96 N.E. 253 (1911).
66. Brownlie v. Brownlie, 357 11. 117, 191 N.E. 268 (1934).
159, 122 N.E. 520 (1919).
67. Snyder v. Steele, 287 Ill.
How careful can the litigator be in properly asking whether the testator had the ability to
48, 95 N.E. 1034
know what property he had, e.g., Voodry v. University of Illinois, 251 Ill.
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be laid for the attesting witness to testify as to his belief,6 8 the
distinctions drawn by the courts are even more puzzling.
2.

Lay Witnesses

Unlike the opinion testimony from the attesting witnesses as to
the testator's capacity, other lay witnesses must state a foundation
for their opinions. 69 The facts elicited in laying the foundation
must reasonably tend to support the opinion of the witness as to
the testator's mental condition at the time of the execution of the
document. 70 These facts must relate to the period of time sur-

(1911), and in avoiding the improper query as to whether the testator was able to carry in
his mind and memory the nature and extent of his property? In Baker v. Baker, 202 Il. 595,
67 N.E. 410 (1903), the trial court sustained objections to the following questions and was
sustained on appeal. The attesting witnesses had been asked:
"Whether or not the testator, at the time of making the alleged will, had sufficient
mind and memory to understand the will in question"; "whether or not he was
able to carry in his mind and memory the nature and extent of his property"; and,
"whether or not he was able to understandingly execute the will" .
202 Ill. at 616-17, 67 N.E. at 418.
Voodry v. University of Illinois, 251 Il1. 48, 95 N.E. 1034 (1911), attempted to distinguish
Baker. It appears that the objectionable questions deal with the subjective capabilities of
the testator rather than with objective manifestations. For a clearer and more recent discussion of lay opinions and proper examination, see Trojcak v. Hafliger, 7 Il. App. 3d 495, 288
N.E.2d 82 (1972).
68. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
69. The court in Tyler v. Tyler, 401 II. 435, 440-41, 82 N.E.2d 346, 349 (1948), stated:
Opinions of lay witnesses as to the competency of the testator in a will contest are
admissible when they show opportunities for observation and state sufficient facts
upon which to base an opinion. The rule is that a person who is not an expert may
give his opinion concerning the mental capacity of a testator if it appears that
such witness has an acquaintance with the person whose competency is in question and relates facts and circumstances which afford reasonable ground for determining the soundness or unsoundness of mind of such person, and the value of the
opinion so expressed is such as the capacity, intelligence and observation of the
witness who forms it may warrant.
The rule requiring a foundation is the same as that for other civil actions. The foundation
required is that the witness describe the behavior on which his opinion is based. See Bowman v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 11111. 2d 186, 142 N.E.2d 104 cert. denied, 355 U.S. 837
(1957).
70. In Peters v. Catt, 15 Ill. 2d 255, 154 N.E.2d 280 (1958), the court excluded testimony
of three witnesses who expressed opinions that the testator was of unsound mind. The first
witness had no contact with the decedent prior to the occurrence on which she based her
opinion. Moreover, her opinion was based on the fact that on that occasion, the testator had
refused to talk to her. Although the other witnesses indicated that the decedent repeated
himself in conversations and would not have recognized them, the court stated: "His lack of
loquacity with distant acquaintances can well be explained by his taciturn nature, his admitted old age and physical disability." Id. at 261, 154 N.E.2d at 284. In Shevlin v. Jackson,
5 Ill. 2d 43, 142 N.E.2d 895 (1955), evidence of intoxication and diminished capacity while
intoxicated were not considered, absent proof of intoxication at the time that the will was
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rounding the execution of the document, and the courts are flexible in determining the relevant period.71
Once a foundation exists,72 the lay witnesses may state their
opinion as to the soundness of the testator's mind and memory. 8
The opinion thus elicited, however, must stop short of invading the
province of the jury in determining whether the mental condition
of the testator was such as to render him incompetent to make a
will.7 4 Some decisions have limited opinion testimony to whether

executed.
71. A period of two years prior to the execution was found to be sufficiently proximate to
the execution itself, Voodry v. University of Illinois, 251 111. 48, 95 N.E. 1034 (1911) and in
excess of two years to be too remote and of no probative force, Knudson v. Knudson, 382 Ill.
492, 46 N.E.2d 1011 (1943). As part of the reasonable exercise of its discretion, the court can
take recognition that the testator's illness was progressive or continuing. Milne v. McFadden, 385 Ill. 11, 52 N.E.2d 146 (1944); Ergang v. Anderson, 378 Ill. 312, 38 N.E.2d 26 (1941).
72. The sufficiency of the foundation is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. In
the absence of a foundation, however, any resultant error is considered to be harmless for
the reason that the opinion is of little probative value. Ergang v. Anderson, 378 Ill. 312, 38
N.E.2d 26 (1941). Moreover, the weight to be afforded the testimony is dependent upon the
facts established while laying the foundation, and it is for the jury to determine if the opinion is adequately supported. Hunt v. Vermilion County Children's Home, 381 Ill. 29, 44
N.E.2d 609 (1942). The jury should be instructed to the weight of the testimony being
affected by the foundation thereof. Mitchell v. Van Scoyk, 1 Ill. 2d 160, 115 N.E.2d 226
(1953).
73. Examples of admissible opinion are:
Opinions of witnesses as to sound mind and memory, ability to transact ordinary
business, ability to know relatives, ability to know the nature and extent of property, and the like, are all conclusions of fact which are admissible to enable the
jury, under proper instructions as to sound mind and memory, to determine
whether the testator had mental capacity to execute his will.
.... It is well settled that, after laying the proper foundation, a witness may give
an opinion as to soundness or unsoundness of mind of the testator.
Powell v. Weld, 410 Ill. 198, 201-02, 101 N.E.2d 581, 583 (1951). See also In re Estate. of
Basisch, 79 Ill. App. 3d 997, 398 N.E.2d 1182 (1979); In re Estate of Veronico, 78 I11.App.
3d 379, 396 N.E.2d 1095 (1979).
74. The case of Trojcak v. Hafliger, 7 Ill. App. 3d 495, 288 N.E.2d 82 (1972) is a rare and
refreshing example of clear distinctions between the scope of admissible and inadmissible
inquiry. That decision posits that the conclusion of the ability of the testator to make a will
is inadmissible and reversible error, regardless of whether the testimony is from a lay or
expert witness. It also precludes a treating physician from testifying as to his opinion of the
testator's mental condition at the time of execution. This limitation does not apply to a
physician who is qualified as an expert and who answers in response to a proper hypothetical question.
The decision also reinforces the theory that the opinion of a treating physician is of no
greater weight than that of a lay witness, Tyler v. Tyler, 401 Ill. 435, 440, 82 N.E.2d 346
(1948); Austin v. Austin, 260 Ill. 299, 103 N.E. 268 (1913), and that the jury must be instructed in that regard. Both v. Nelson, 31 Ill. 2d 511, 202 N.E.2d 494 (1964) held it to be
reversible error to refrain from instructing the jury as to the weight to be accorded expert
opinion. The opinion testimony of lay witnesses and non-expert treating physicians must
avoid reference to the ability of the testator to make or understand the execution of the will.
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the decedent was sane or insane, and have excluded opinions as to
the decedent's ability to transact business. 71 Most recent decisions,

however, have permitted opinion evidence as to the capacity of the
testator to transact business.76 It is important to note the distinction between the ability to transact any business and the ability to
transact
ordinary business and determining testamentary capacity.7" The standard of proof of the ability to transact ordinary business is higher than the standard of proof required to prove testamentary capacity.7 8 Conversely, the inability to transact any
business is measured by a lower standard of proof than that necessary to prove testamentary capacity. Proof going to either the
higher or lower standard, therefore, by implication establishes
7
whether the decedent had testamentary capacity. '

3. Expert Witnesses
Expert testimony is subject to the general distinction between
opinions and conclusions, and therefore, experts must avoid testifying as to their conclusion on the testator's ability to make a
will.80 An opinion can be given as an answer to a hypothetical
question presented to the expert on the mental capacity of the testator, 81 subject to the ordinary rules governing such questions in
other civil cases.82 Special care should be taken by all parties to
ensure that the expert's opinion is based solely upon facts in evidence, and is not based on conversations between the expert and
witnesses disqualified under the Dead Man's Act.88 Expert opinion,
however, is "not highly regarded" in a will contest because of the
See, e.g., Coleman v. Marshall, 263 Ill. 330, 104 N.E. 1042 (1914); Wetzel v. Firebaugh, 251
Ill. 190, 95 N.E. 1085 (1911); Baker v. Baker, 202 Ill. 595, 67 N.E. 410 (1903); Trojcak v.
Hafliger, 7 I1. App. 3d 495, 288 N.E.2d 82 (1972).
75. Trubey v. Richardson, 224 Ill. 136, 79 N.E. 592 (1906).
76. See Trojcak v. Hafliger, 7 Ill. App. 3d 495, 288 N.E.2d 82 (1972).
77. Hess v. Killerbrew, 209 Ill. 193, 70 N.E. 675 (1904); Trojcak v. Hafliger, 7 Il. App. 3d
495, 288 N.E.2d 82 (1972). See also discussion at James, supra note 3, at § 92.4.
78. Speirer v. Curtis, 312 Ill. 152, 143 N.E. 427 (1924); Dowdey v. Palmer, 287 Ill. 42, 122
N.E. 102 (1919).
79. Ravenscroft v. Stull, 280 Ill. 406, 117 N.E. 602 (1917).
80. Garrus v. Davis, 234 11. 326, 84 N.E. 924 (1908). But see Both v. Nelson, 46 Ill. App.
2d 69, 74, 196 N.E.2d 530, 532 (1964) (dicta).
81. Garrus v. Davis, 234 Ill. 326, 94 N.E. 924 (1908). Trojcak v. Hafliger, 7 11. App. 3d
495, 288 N.E. 2d 82 (1972). But consider that the witness not qualified as an expert can still
testify as a layman, if a foundation is laid. In re Estate of Veronico, 78 Ill. App. 3d 379, 396
N.E.2d 1095 (1979).
82. Cf. In re Estate of Veronica, 78 Ill. App. 3d 379, 396 N.E.2d 1095 (1979); Pendarvis
v. Gibb, 328 Ill. 282, 159 N.E. 353 (1972).
83. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
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statutory emphasis on the opinions of attesting witnesses. 8,4
(C)

Undue Influence

Evidence that is insufficient to prove lack of testamentary capacity may nevertheless be sufficient to show the testator to have been
susceptible to the influence of others interested in the disposition
of his property. The courts have recognized that a person with diminished mental capacity is a fortiorari more likely to submit to
undue influence.85 The greater the testator's mental deficiency, the
weaker the proof that is required to establish the existence of such
undue influence. 86 The contestant, therefore, can use the evidence
for dual purposes: if the evidence is held insufficient on the issue of
testamentary capacity, the foundation has already been laid for
proof of undue influence. 7
1. Circumstantial Proof
Undue influence is universally recognized as a specie of fraud. 8
This fact further assists the contestant in his proofs. Undue influence by its nature is perpetrated in secret and can be rarely established by direct proof, and therefore may be proved by circumstantial evidence.8 ' The totality of the evidence, however, must still
establish all the necessary elements of undue influence. The contestant must show that the influence: (1) was directly connected to
the execution of the will; (2) operated at the time the will was
made; (3) was directed toward procuring a will in favor of a particular party; and (4) was of such a character as to have destroyed the
testator's free will."0
84. 3 James, supra note 3, at § 92.4(1) n.67; Yowell v. Hunter, 403 Ill. 202, 85 N.E.2d 674
(1949). Such emphasis throughout the proceeding is logically consistent with the effort to
minimize the experts' opinion. Since the attesting witnesses are required to state their opinions, are excused from the general foundation requirement, and their testimony at the probate hearing is automatically admitted in the will contest, courts are disinclined to substitute the judgment of an expert for these statutorily important witnesses.
85. See Mitchell v. Van Scoyk, 1 Ill. 2d 160, 115 N.E.2d 226 (1953), and cases cited
therein.

86.

Id.

87. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Van Scoyk, 1 Ill. 2d 160, 115 N.E.2d 226 (1953); Baker v. Baker,
202 Ill. 595, 67 N.E. 410 (1903); Beyers v. Billingsley, 54 Ill. App. 3d 427, 369 N.E.2d 1320
(1977). In both Beyers and Mitchell the court found the evidence going to the testator's
mental capacity relevant to both the issue of testamentary capacity and undue influence.
88. 79 AM. JUR. 2d Wills § 441 (1975), and cases cited therein.
89. Id.
90. Sterling v. Kramer, 15 Ill. App. 2d 230, 145 N.E.2d 757 (1957). See also Butler v.
O'Brien, 8 Ill. 2d 203, 133 N.E.2d 274 (1956); Sterling v. Dubin, 6 Ill. 2d 64, 126 N.E.2d 718
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Presumption as to Fiduciary-Beneficiaries

Another evidentiary factor which aids the contestant in proving
undue influence is the recognized presumption of undue influence
where the chief beneficiary of a will stood in a fiduciary relationship to the testator and was instrumental in the testator's preparation of the will. 1 In Belfield v. Coop, 92 the Illinois Supreme Court,
repudiating prior law, 9" declared that for a presumption of undue
influence to exist, the contestant must show: "(1) there [is] a
fiduciary or confidential relationship, (2) that the devisee is the
dominant and the testator is the dependent party, and (3) that the
will was procured by and in favor of the fiduciary through the use
of his dominant fiduciary or confidential relationship."" Once
these three elements are established, the burden shifts to the proponent of the will to show that the will was the product of the
testator's free deliberation.
The evidence necessary to prove the presumption, however, can
sometimes be more difficult to assemble than proof of the undue
influence itself. "Fiduciary relationship" is a vague and general
concept that can describe any relationship wherein one places special confidence in another who owes him equitable duties. 5 The
relationship exists as a matter of law, for example, between attor(1955); Shevlin v. Jackson, 5 Ill. 2d 43, 124 N.E.2d 895 (1955); In re Estate of Basich, 79 Ill.
App. 3d 997, 398 N.E.2d 1182 (1979); In re Estate of Ariola, 69 IM. App. 3d 158, 368 N.E.2d
862 (1979).
Failure to prove any one of these elements will preclude a finding of undue influence. See,
e.g., In re Estate of Letsche, 73 Ill. App. 3d 643, 392 N.E.2d 612 (1979), where the contestant failed to prove any participation by another in procuring the will.
91. Courts have described the beneficiary's participation in the preparation of the will as
the "procuring cause" for the will's creation, because they see the beneficiary procuring the
will in his own favor.
92. 8 Ill. 2d 293, 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956).
93. To raise the presumption of undue influence under prior law, the contestant needed
2d
to show only that the chief beneficiary procured the will. Mitchell v. Van Scoyk, 1 Ill.
160, 115 N.E.2d 226 (1953); Friberg v. Zeutschel, 379 II. 480, 41 N.E.2d 512 (1942);
240, 23 N.E.2d 46 (1939). When the estate attempts,
Sulzberger v. Sulzberger, 372 Ill.
through a citation proceeding, to recover a non-testamentary gift made by the testator to a
fiduciary, proof by the estate of the fiduciary relationship is sufficient to raise the presumption that the non-testamentary gift was fraudulently procured. See, e.g., Crawford v. Krebs,
App. 3d 390, 345
40 Ill. App. 3d 568, 352 N.E.2d 76 (1976); In re Estate of Heilman, 37 Ill.
N.E. 2d 536 (1976). In both situations, the burden shifted to the opponent to disprove the
presumption of undue influence. The Belfield court combined these two concepts into a
presumption containing the elements of both. The Belfield decision has been criticized. See
Kahn, New Doctrine of Undue Influence, 45 ILL. B.J. 436 (1957).
94. Belfield v. Coop, 8 Il.2d 293, 309, 134 N.E.2d 249, 258 (1956), quoting Redmond v.
Steele, 5 Ill. 2d 602, 612, 126 N.E.2d 619, 625 (1955).
95. Kolze v. Fordtran, 412 IIl. 461, 468, 107 N.E.2d 686, 690 (1952).
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ney and client, broker and principal. Where the relationship does
not exist as a matter of law, however, it must be proved by clear,
convincing and unequivocal evidence." Evidence of a close rela-

tionship of mutual confidence and trust is not sufficient to establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship. Furthermore, there

must be a showing that the beneficiary held the dominant position
in his relationship with the testator." Where there has been no

evidence of special confidence by the testator and no domination
by the beneficiary, courts have refused to find undue influence. 98

Even if the evidence establishes a fiduciary relationship in which
the beneficiary was the dominant party," a presumption of undue
influence will not arise unless the evidence also shows that the
beneficiary was instrumental in procuring the will. °° This "procuring cause" factor 0 1 must have existed at the time of the execution

of the will and been directly connected to the execution.10 2 It is
impossible to determine from existing case law what acts by a
fiduciary-beneficiary will constitute sufficient participation in the
execution of the will to give rise to the presumption.10 8 The mere
presence of the beneficiary when the will is discussed, drawn, and
executed appears to be insufficient.'" Evidence that the beneficiary also arranged for the attesting witnesses has likewise been
considered insufficient to constitute procurement or participation.108 Evidence that the beneficiary telephoned the attorney, re-

96. Id.; Brown v. Brown, 62 111.
App. 3d 328, 379 N.E.2d 634 (1978).
97. Redmond v. Steele, 5 11. 2d 602, 126 N.E.2d 619 (1955).
98. See Sterling v. Dubin, 6 I. 2d 64, 126 N.E.2d 718 (1955) (testator and beneficiary
maintained an illicit sexual relationship); Shevlin v. Jackson, 5 III. 2d 43, 124 N.E.2d 895
(1955) (beneficiary cared for the testator during illness). In both cases, the relationship between the beneficiary and testator was held insufficient to presume undue influence.
99. For examples of cases in which a fiduciary relationship has been found, see Mitchell
v. Van Scoyk, 1 Ill. 2d 160, 115 N.E.2d 226 (1953); Wilk v. Hagen, 410 Ill.
158, 101 N.E.2d
585 (1951); Swenson v. Wintercorn, 92 IM. App. 2d 88, 234 N.E.2d 91 (1968).
100. Powell v. Weld, 410 Ill. 198, 101 N.E.2d 581 (1951); Powell v. Bechtel, 340 Ill. 330,
172 N.E. 765 (1930). Compare In re Estate of Basich, 79 Ill. App. 3d 997, 398 N.E.2d 1182
(1979) with In re Estate of Letsche, 73 Ill. App. 3d 643, 392 N.E.2d 612 (1979).
101. See cases cited at note 100 supra.
102. In re Estate of Ariola, 69 IM. App. 3d 158, 386 N.E.2d 862 (1979). The fiduciary
need not be present, however, when the will is signed. Mitchell v. Van Scoyk, 1 Ill.
2d 160
(1953); Sterling v. Kramer, 15 IlM.App. 2d 230, 145 N.E.2d 757 (1957).
103. See 44 ILL. B.J. 222 (1955).
104. Lake v. Seiffert, 410 IMl.444, 102 N.E.2d 294 (1951).
105. Powell v. Weld, 410 Ill. 198, 101 N.E.2d 581 (1951). See also Powell v. Bechtel, 340
Ill. 330, 172 N.E. 765 (1930) (no presumption where beneficiary contacted attesting witnesses and was present when will was signed); Flanigon v. Smith, 337 Ill.
572, 169 N.E. 767
(1930) (no presumption where beneficiary called attorney who drafted will and contacted
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mained in the testator's presence while the testator instructed the
attorney to prepare the will, drove the testator to the attorney's
office to obtain the will, and later produced the will for execution
while the testator was being examined by his doctor, however, was
held sufficient to raise the presumption. °6 On the other hand,
where the contestant produced evidence that the testator's personal secretary and a chief beneficiary under the will transcribed
and corrected a draft of the will, but failed to establish that the
beneficiary discussed or suggested 1the
provisions, no presumption
07
of undue influence was established.

(D)

Miscellaneous Evidentary Concerns in Wills Contests

Generally, and in conformity with the statute on wills,108 the
declarations of a testator will not be admitted for the purpose of
impeaching or contradicting the will.1° The testator's declarations,
however, will be admissible on the issues of testamentary capacity,
diminished capacity and susceptibility to undue influence if offered
to prove the mental condition or state of mind of the decedent.110
attesting witnesses).
106. Wilk v. Hagan, 410 Ill. 158, 101 N.E.2d 585 (1951).
107. Sterling v. Dubin, 6 II. 2d 64, 126 N.E.2d 718 (1955).
108. Although the Probate Act is silent on the issue of the admissibility of the testator's
declarations, the section setting forth the requirements of a valid will suggests that oral
declarations are inadmissible in view of the writing requirement contained therein. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1101/2,
4-3 (1979) provides: "Every will shall be in writing, signed by the testator
or some person in his presence and by his direction and attested in the presence of the
testator by two or more credible witnesses." (Emphasis added).
109. Prinz v. Schmidt, 334 IH. 576, 166 N.E. 209 (1929); Waters v. Waters, 222 Ill. 26, 78
N.E. 1 (1906). But see Werling v. Grosse, 76 Ill. App. 3d 834, 395 N.E.2d 629 (1979) (admitted into evidence declarations against interest). This general exclusionary rule applies even
as to the issue of forgery, resulting in the exclusion of a decedent's statement that he did
not have a will. Stepanian v. Asadourian, 283 Ill. App. 495, 1 N.E.2d 753 (1936).
110. Because these declarations are out-of-court statements of the decedent, the hearsay
rule will be triggered if the decedent's statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted. But where the statement is offered for another purpose, the hearsay objection cannot
be made. Thus, where the statement is offered to prove the decedent's state of mind, on the
issues of capacity and undue influence, the hearsay objection should be overruled. See GARD,
ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL 334 (1963).
It is imperative to recall that the testator's declarations must be related by a witness not
rendered incompetent by the Dead Man's Act, regardless of the purpose for which those
declarations are submitted. The parties are, therefore, precluded from repeating the testator's declarations, but their own admissions may be asserted against them. See note 4 supra.
In Teter v. Spomer, 305 Ill. 198, 137 N.E. 129 (1922), the testator's declaration that his
son had offered the testator's attorney $50,000 to change the testator's will was not of the
offered bribe, but was admissible to prove that the testator may have intended to reduce the
share of the estate to be bequeathed to the son. See also GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL
335 (1963); Healea v. Keenan, 244 Ill. 484, 91 N.E. 646 (1910); Peet v. Peet, 229 Ill. 341, 82
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Admissibility is conditional upon a finding that the statement is
not too remote in time from the date upon which the will was exe-

cuted.'

Additionally, only those statements consistent with the

terms of the will are admissible to prove a competent state of

mind." 2 Testator declarations which are inconsistent with will
terms are deemed inadmissible unless there exists other evidence
tending to prove incapacity." 3 The rationale for this distinction is

that whereas the consistent statement is indicative of the testator's
ability to understand the nature and extent of the disposition of

his property," 4 an inconsistent statement, standing alone, should
not be indicative of a lack of capacity when such a statement may
merely represent a change of intent." 5
The existing law concerning the admissibility of prior wills", ap-

N.E. 370 (1907).
As to the issue of susceptibility to undue influence, see Reynolds v. Adams, 90 II. 134
(1878); Annot. 79 A.L.R. 1447 (1932). Note that not only oral declarations are admissible,
but also deeds, checks, notes and other documents, including business documents, which
tend to show the capacity to transact ordinary business. 3 James, supra note 3, at § 92.4(1).
111. Ravenscroft v. Stull, 280 Ill.
406, 117 N.E. 602 (1917) (error to admit declarations
made 4 or 5 years prior to execution of will); Baker v. Baker, 202 II. 595, 67 N.E. 410 (1903)
(no fixed rule can be given); see also note 70 supra.
112. Belz v. Piepenbrink, 318 I1. 528, 149 N.E. 483 (1925). Consistent declarations are
also admissible to rebut allegations of fraud or substitution. Wombacher v. Barthelme, 194
11. 425, 62 N.E. 800 (1902).
113. Knudson v. Knudson, 382 Ill.
492, 46 N.E. 1011 (1943); Hurley v. Caldwell, 244 Ill.
448, 91 N.E. 654 (1910).
114. Maher v. Maher, 338 Ill.
102, 170 N.E. 221 (1930).
115. Hurley v. Caldwell, 244 Il. 448, 91 N.E. 654 (1910).
116. See Schuyler, supra note 2, at 925.
It should be noted that the admission of a prior will into evidence can be disadvantageous
to a proponent if in fact the will represents to the jury a disposition that they consider more
fair than the will at issue. Courts have recognized the propensity for jurors to rewrite wills
providing for an unequal distribution of property. Thus, where the prior will informs the
jury as to the exact interests of the contestants, it can be very prejudicial. For example, in
Heideman v. Kelsey, the Illinois Sureme Court reversed a lower court decision as tainted by
a jury instruction identifying the contestant as the sole heir-at-law, thereby prejudicing the
proponent. The court stated:
In this kind of case, it is highly important that trial errors be reduced to a minimum. This court made the following observation in a parallel situation in
Turnbull v. Butterfield, 304 Ill. 454, 137 N.E. 476: "In a will contest, where the
will seems to have made an unequal division of property there is a disposition in
the mind of the average juror to hold such will invalid and to look for an excuse to
do so, notwithstanding the law is that the testator may make such disposition of
his property as he sees fit and may bestow his bounty where he wishes. This tendency on the part of jurors runs counter to the rule of law that they have nothing
to do with the equity or inequity of a will and that the children of a testator have
no property rights in the parent's property. These facts make it necessary that the
jury be carefully instructed on the issue of mental soundness of the testator where
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pears to contravene the rules regarding the admissibility of the testator's oral declarations. Unlike prior consistent oral declarations,
a prior consistent will is not admissible, unless the contestants admit to the testator's sanity at the time of the execution of the prior
will." 7 Although an inconsistent prior will is inadmissible to show
lack of capacity," 8 it is admissible to show the interest of a disinherited beneficiary under the prior will where undue influence is
alleged," 9 though the prior will is inadmissible to show that undue
influence was used to change the terms. If, however, the prior will
is consistent, it is admissible for purposes of rebutting a charge of
20
undue influence.
Statements made by a devisee at or near the time of the execution of the will are admissible by the contestant to show lack of
testamentary capacity.' 2 ' Also, the acts, conduct and statements of
the contestants are admissible on the issue of capacity.12 2 Admission into evidence of statements or acts of undue influence of individual proponents is not allowed against multiple defendants un23
less their interests are joint.

such a will has been executed. This court has invariably condemned instructions
which offer the jury an excuse to determine whether a will is a just and proper
disposition of the property of the testator"
7 Ill. 2d 601, 606-07, 131 N.E.2d 531, 534 (1956).
117. Burns v. Schmidt, 22 Ill. 2d 47, 174 N.E.2d 188 (1961); Pollock v. Pollock, 328 Ill.
179, 159 N.E. 305 (1927).
118. Pollock v. Pollock, 328 Ill. 179, 159 N.E. 305 (1927); Floto v. Floto, 233 Ill. 605, 84
N.E. 712 (1908). But see Aftalion v. Stauffer, 284 Ill.
54, 119 N.E. 981 (1918).
119. Balckhurst v. James, 304 Ill. 586, 136 N.E. 754 (1922); Sterling v. Kramer, 15 Ill.
App. 2d 230, 145 N.E.2d 757 (1957).
120. Passenheim v. Reinert, 362 Ill.
576, 1 N.E.2d 69 (1936) (ante-execution declaration
of testator also admissible to rebut undue influence charge); Waters v. Waters, 222 Inl. 26, 78
N.E. 1 (1906). Such a rule relies on the rationale that it is more likely for the subsequent
will to have been executed free of undue influence if it is in conformity to prior declarations
than if it were contrary to such declarations. See Harp v. Parr, 168 Ill. 459, 48 N.E. 113
(1897). The rule has also been applied to consistent post-execution declarations. Herbolsheimer v. Herbolsheimer, 46 Ill.
App. 3d 563, 361 N.E.2d 134 (1977).
121. Brainard v. Brainard, 259 Ill.
613, 103 N.E. 45 (1913); Egbers v. Egbers, 177 Ill.
82,
52 N.E. 285 (1898).
122. Rowcliffe v. Belson, 261 Ill. 566, 104 N.E. 268 (1914) (admitted checks drawn by the
testator as admissions by the contestants as to the decedent's capacity to transact business).
See also Chambers v. Appel, 392 Ill. 294, 64 N.E.2d 511 (1946) (judicial admission and admissions against interest by contestants discussed and distinguished).
123. Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 300, 134 N.E.2d 249, 253 (1956). But see Latham v.
Rischel, 384 I1. 478, 51 N.E.2d 531 (1943), distinguished in Belfield, wherein the declarant
himself can be called and interrogated as to his own misconduct. The result of the distinction is that if there is more than one beneficiary of the will in question, the contestant will
have to waive the bar of the Dead Man's Act with respect to the guilty proponent in order
to secure testimony of that proponent's statement or conduct, when the other legatees are
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BREACH OF CONTRACT

Actions brought to establish a contract to make a will or a contract not to revoke""4 an existing will do not challenge the will itself, but instead seek to vary the terms of the will. Contract actions
of this type most frequently arise to enforce a joint dispositive
scheme12 5 or an agreement to devise property in exchange. for ser-

vices. Although general contract principles apply in these cases,
the contract and all of its terms must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, as opposed to the lesser standard of preponderance of the evidence.' This standard is exceptionally onerous for
the contestant.
The most difficult evidentiary problem is proving the existence
of the will contract.'2 7 Statements against interest of the decedent
innocent parties. It should also be noted that statements of one proponent are not admissible against the others unless a conspiracy is alleged. Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 134
N.E.2d 249 (1956). See also Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 361 Ill. 499, 198 N.E. 432 (1935); Pollock
v. Pollock, 328 Ill. 179, 159 N.E. 305 (1927); Joyal v. Pilotte, 293 Inl. 377, 127 N.E. 741
(1920).
124. Statements or admissions by the testator relative to revocation are governed by the
statute on revocation. See note 47 supra. Declarations falling short of the statutory requirements are not sufficient to revoke the will. See, e.g., In re Estate of Mitchell, 305 Ill. App.
289, 27 N.E.2d 606 (1940). Once a valid revocation has been established, however, such declarations are admissible to show the state of mind of the testator at the time of revocation.
In re Estate of Willavize, 21 Ill. 2d 40, 171 N.E.2d 21 (1914); In re Barrie's Will, 393 Ill. 111,
65 N.E.2d 433 (1946); Burton v. Wylde, 261 Ill. 397, 103 N.E. 976 (1914); Craig v. Wismar,
310 Ill. 262, 141 N.E. 766 (1923); Craig v. Trotter, 252 Ill. 228, 96 N.E. 1003 (1911). See also
Szarat v. Schuerr, 365 Ill. 323, 6 N.E.2d 625 (1937).
125. The joint dispositive scheme may consist of a joint, mutual, reciprocal, or joint and
mutual wills. A joint will is one where two or more persons execute one document to serve as
the will of all and disposes of property owned jointly or severally. A mutual or reciprocal
will, on the other hand, are the separate wills of two or more persons which on their face,
when considered together, are part of an integrated plan of disposition. Finally, a joint and
mutual will is a single document containing reciprocal provisions. JAM&S, supra note 3, at
§ 42.5. See also Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909).
126. Wessel v. Eilenberger, 2 Ill. 2d 522, 119 N.E.2d 207 (1954); Sorenson v. First Natl
Bank, 59 Il. App. 3d 150, 376 N.E.2d 18 (1978); In re Estate of Knight, 51111. App. 2d 198,
200 N.E.2d 916 (1964). The court in In re Estate of Pomeroy, 21 Ill. App. 3d 648, 652, 316
N.E.2d 231, 234-35 (1974), stated:
A court should enforce an alleged contract and order a distribution of the decedent's estate different from that set forth in a validly executed will only after the
contract's existence and terms have been proved by clear, explicit and convincing
evidence which leaves no reasonable doubt that (1) the contract was made; and,
(2) that there was a meeting of the minds as to all its terms.
See also Chambers v. Appel, 392 Ill. 294, 64 N.E.2d 511 (1946).
127. If the existence of a contract is established, the claimant then must prove performance of his or her obligations.
Wessel v. Eilenberger, 2 Ill. 2d 522, 119 N.E.2d 207 (1954). This proof may consist of
showing performance of the services promised, or, in the case of contracts not to revoke, the
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are admissible"' in such actions subject to certain important limitations. The most obvious limitation is that the witness testifying

as to the statements cannot be one who is rendered incompetent
under the Dead Man's Act."'" Additionally, the decedent's statements must have been made out of the presence of the party
claiming under the contract and be accompanied by conduct indicative of the agreement. 130 Even after the decedent's statements
against interest are submitted into evidence, 'they are carefully
scrutinized and may be rejected, although uncontradicted, if not
clear and convincing. 8 1
Compounding the effect of the restrictions imposed upon the decedent's statements, all facts and circumstances going to the incon132
sistency or improbability of a contract are considered relevant.
death of the first testator without drafting another will, in reliance on the mutual dispositive
scheme. Only then can the appropriate relief be granted. Enforcement of the contract underlying the will may arise under many different theories or causes of actions. Most common
is a suit in equity to enforce the contract of a joint and mutual will. Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill.
538, 191 N.E. 307 (1934). Other forms of suits consist of: partition proceedings, Frazier v.
Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909); equitable accountings, Jacoby v. Jacoby, 342 Ill.
App. 277, 96 N.E.2d 362 (1950); quiet title proceedings, Bonczkowski v. Kucharski, 13 Ill. 2d
443, 150 N.E.2d 144 (1958); construction of the will, Jusko v. Grigas, 26 Ill. 2d 92, 186
N.E.2d 34 (1962); suits to set aside deeds, First United Presbyterian Church v. Christenson,
64 Ill. 2d 491, 356 N.E.2d 532 (1976); and citation proceedings, In re Estate of Bell, 6 Ill.
App. 3d 802, 286 N.E.2d 589 (1972). See also CONTESTED ESTATES, supra note 1, at § 8.15.
While a separate action to enforce the contract or for damages can be instituted at any
time within two years of the death of the testator, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, 24(e) (1979), a
claim for specific performance may also be made. CONTESTED ESTATES, supra note 1,at § 8.3.
The contract, to make a will or devise, sought to be enforced by specific performance may
be oral. Werling v. Grosse, 76 Ill. App. 3d 834, 395 N.E.2d 629 (1979). A conveyance by the
personal representative of an estate, however, will be granted only under very limited circumstances. Wessel v. Eilenberger, 2 IM.2d 522, 527, 119 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1954) (the granting of specific performance should be only in those cases "in which a gross fraud would be
suffered by the promisee if specific performance were denied."). Moreover, specific performance will be denied where an award of damages would be adequate. Id. See also In re Estate
of Johnson, 39 Ill. App. 3d 246, 350 N.E.2d 310 (1976).
128. McCabe v. Hebner, 410 Ill. 557, 102 N.E.2d 794 (1951); Fushanis v. Poulos, 85 Ill.
App. 2d 114, 229 N.E.2d 306 (1967); Vogel v. Murphy, 182 Ill. App. 631 (1913).
129. Thus, the contestant is automatically precluded from testifying as to the decedent's
statements. See note 4 supra.
130. Fletcher v. Osborn, 282 Ill. 143, 118 N.E. 446 (1918); Wrestler v. Tippy, 280 Ill. 124,
117 N.E. 404 (1917).
131. Greenwood v. Commercial National Bank of Peoria, 7 Ill. 2d 436, 130 N.E.2d 753
(1956); Monninger v. Koob, 405 IMI.417, 91 N.E.2d 411 (1950); Moreen v. Estate of Carlson,
365 Ill. 482, 489, 6 N.E.2d 871, 874 (1937), quoting Lea v. Polk County Copper Co., 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 493 (1858) (the court rejected testimony of the claimant's fiancee noting, "courts
of Justice lend a very unwilling ear to statements of what dead men have said.").
132. Only self-serving statements of the decedent are not considered relevant. Dalby v.
Maxfield, 244 Il. 214, 91 N.E. 420 (1910); Oswald v. Nehls, 233 Ill. 438, 84 N.E. 619 (1908).
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The will of the testator is admissible as indicative of the absence of
a contract. s Actions of the decedent, as well as conduct of the
claimant prior and subsequent to the decedent's death also are
34
admissible.
Where the contract is alleged to be embodied in a will, 33 different rules may apply. A presumption of a contract will arise when
the document is the joint and mutual will of two parties. In such
situations, the form of the will is considered to be the strongest
evidence of the contract,' 6 although the party asserting that the
instrument is both contractual and testamentary still has a signifi133. Anson v. Haywood, 397 Ill. 370, 74 N.E.2d 489 (1947); Chambers v. Appel, 392 II.
294, 64 N.E.2d 511 (1946); Rigolio v. Knopf, 390 Ill. 258, 61 N.E.2d 56 (1945).
134. In re Estate of Baskin, 93 Ill. App. 2d 445, 236 N.E.2d 296 (1968).
135. For example, in Freese v. Freese, 49 Ill.
App. 3d 1041, 364 N.E.2d 983 (1977) the
court held that a contract existed where the separate wills of the husband and wife contained the following provision:
It is understood by me that a Will is being made on this same day and date by my
beloved wife [husband], disposing of her [his] property and that it is understood
by both of us that this Will and her [his] Will are to be considered as reciprocal
and mutual as the plan we have mutually made for the disposition of all of the
property owned by us and each of us and the division of same between our
children.
Id. at 1042, 364 N.E.2d at 984.
See also In re Estate of Willis, 33 Ill. App. 3d 279, 337 N.E.2d 35 (1975) (wherein the issue
was whether a notice provision in a joint will was complied with).
136. Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E.2d 216 (1909); In re Estate of Willis, 33 Ill.
App. 3d 279, 337 N.E.2d 35 (1975). When the reciprocal or mutual dispositive scheme is not
embodied in the same instrument, the presumption does not arise. Thus, clear and convincing proof of a contract and the consideration to support it must be made aliunde. Frese v.
Meyer, 392 Ill. 59, 63 N.E.2d 768 (1945); Freese v. Freese, 49 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 364 N.E.2d
983 (1977); Campbell v. Cowden, 18 111.App. 3d 500, 309 N.E.2d 601 (1974); Nat'l Bank v.
Emerson, 335 Ill.
App. 494, 82 N.E.2d 382 (1948). See also Jordan v. McGrew, 400 Ill. 275,
79 N.E.2d 622 (1948). A recital in mutual and reciprocal wills that they are contractual will
stand alone, and no further proof of the contract is necessary. In re Estate of Kritsch, 65 Ill.
App. 3d 404, 382 N.E.2d 50 (1978).
Coincidental dispositive provisions, expressions of gratitude, or declarations of intent are
insufficient to raise the presumption of the existence of a contract. Because a promise to
make a bequest is not enforceable absent all of the elements of a contract, declarations of an
intent to make a bequest fall short of the definite and certain terms required. Willison v.
Stoutin, 4 Ill. App. 3d 490, 280 N.E.2d 564 (1972). Even if the intent is accompanied by
statements indicating an obligation, i.e., "I owe them for staying over there," the requisite
specificity is missing. Likewise, expressions of gratitude for services rendered, absent any
agreement for payment, are insufficient to support a contract even where the testator had
declared an intention to make a bequest. In re Estate of McLaughlin, 1 Ill. App. 3d 940, 274
N.E.2d 618 (1971); Cain v. Hougham, 116 Ill. App. 2d 439, 253 N.E.2d 137 (1969). The
contestant should be wary of a decedent's declaration of intent to bequeath since such statements are inconsistent with notions of contractual obligation. In re Estate of McLaughlin, 1
Ill. App. 3d 940, 274 N.E.2d 618 (1971).
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cant burden of proof to establish a contract.137
EVIDENTIARY REFORM: SOME SUGGESTIONS

Evidentiary rules should reflect a concern for accurate reconstruction rather than encourage conflict by excluding probative information. Several areas of estate litigation would benefit from evidentiary reform. First, despite intense criticism, the Dead Man's
Act remains resilient, if not impenetrable. While its purpose was to
prevent fraud by disqualifying interested persons from testifying,
the statute may actually promote fraud by denying access to justice for litigants whose only evidence is their own testimony. In
refusing to repeal the statute, the legislature exhibits a lack of confidence in attorneys and juries to distinguish truthful testimony
from falsehood. Should the Act be repealed, the potentially false
testimony would merely be subject to the same impeachment and
scrutiny as fabricated evidence is in other cases. While the Dead
Man's Act remains a challenge to the trial attorney, whose investigation must uncover non-interested witnesses, attorney time would
be far better spent in cross-examinating and impeaching interested
persons.
Lay opinion on the mental capacity of the testator should be
prohibited, with the sole exception of the attesting witnesses.
Under current law, non-attesting witnesses must testify as to facts
supporting their opinions. The jury should be able to reach their
own conclusion as to the ultimate issue in the case relying solely on
the facts of the testator's conduct as recounted by the lay witnesses. To establish rules for opinion testimony merely compounds, rather than cures, the problem.
Conversely, all of the decedent's declarations should be admissible in evidence. This should include prior wills, statements inconsistent with the profferred will and declarations made to persons
deemed incompetent under the Dead Man's Act. Admittedly, the
decedent is not available to refute or rebut such statements, but if
both sides to the controversy are permitted to introduce the decedent's statements, subject to cross-examination, prejudice should
be minimal. Since the representative of the estate appears on behalf of the decedent, the decedent's declarations could be conceived of as admissions and therefore be excepted from the hearsay
rule.
137.
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The current exceptions to the rule regarding the inadmissibility
of the testator's declarations weigh heavily in favor of the proponent of the will. Moreover, the profound injustice codified in the
Dead Man's Act is most often visited on the contestant since he is
not entitled to any presumption as to the invalidity of the will.
The combination of these factors promotes the successful use of
undue influence on the aged and enfeebled and denies the rightful
objects of their bounty equal access to justice. The burden of overcoming the presumption of validity is adequately onerous independent of additional obstacles. The will contest should proceed as an
ordinary civil matter and not as an ordeal of confusion.

